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FEDERAL INCOME TAX-26 U.S.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A)-THE SELFEMPLOYED TAXPAYER'S DASHED HOPES OF A HoME OFFICE DEDUCTION.
Commissioner v. Soliman, 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).
I.

INTRODUCTION

Self-employment is a growing phenomenon in America's business
sector, due in part to advances in technology. Today, it is not
uncommon to find a personal computer in the average American
home. The array of available software and lower costs in photocopiers
and facsimile machines have contributed to the increase in home
businesses. Furthermore, a freelance worker can reduce the cost of
overhead that might necessarily doom a small business by turning
an extra bedroom into an office, a seemingly sensible decision.
Commissioner v. Soliman' has effectively dashed the hopes of
self-employed taxpayers seeking to deduct any expenses incurred in
the furnishing or use of an office at home which are connected
with a trade or business. The Supreme Court held that a taxpayer
may be entitled to a home office deduction only if the taxpayer
spends the majority of his time in his office or actually meets clients
in a home office. 2

II.

FACTS

In 1983, the tax year in question, Nader E. Soliman ("taxpayer")
was a self-employed anesthesiologist who lived in Virginia and worked
in hospitals in both Virginia and Maryland.' He had privileges to
work in three hospitals, two in Maryland and one in Virginia, 4 none
of which provided an office for him. 5 The taxpayer turned a spare
bedroom of his Virginia condominium into an office, which he
furnished with "a chair, desk, telephone, answering machine, sofa,
copier, and filing cabinet ' 6 and used exclusively for his medical
practice. 7 In this office he kept his medical library, patient records
1. 113 S. Ct. 701 (1993).

2. Id. at 708.
3. Id. at 704. For further discussion of the Soliman decision, see James A.
Fellows, Current Status of Home Office Deductions Needs Clarification, 72 J.
TAX'N 332, 334 (1990).

4. Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52, 53 (4th Cir. 1991).
5. Id.

6. Id.
7. Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20, 24 (1990). One of the requirements
of 26 U.S.C. § 280A(c)(1) is that the portion of the dwelling unit that is allocated
as an office for a trade or business must be "exclusively used on a regular basis."
26 U.S.C. § 280A(c)(1) (1988). The Commissioner conceded that Dr. Soliman met
this requirement. 94 T.C. at 24.
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and correspondence, billing records, and information on surgeons,
collections, and insurance. 8 He spent two to three hours per day in
his home office performing such necessary tasks as telephoning
surgeons, hospitals, and patients; maintaining billing records and
patient charts; researching and preparing for specific patient treatments; preparing for monthly presentations to post-anesthesia care
nurses (required by one of the hospitals); and performing work
required to satisfy the profession's continuing medical education
requirements. 9 The taxpayer spent thirty to thirty-five hours per week
in the three hospitals administering anesthesia, caring for patients
following surgery, and treating patients for pain.' 0
On his 1983 tax return, the taxpayer claimed deductions for his
home office, including a portion 'of his utilities, condominium fees,
and depreciation on the condominium." Following an audit, the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("Commissioner") disallowed these
deductions, ruling that the home office was not the taxpayer's
principal place of business.' 2 The Commissioner assessed a deficiency,
and the taxpayer sought review of the assessment by filing a petition
3
in the Tax Court.
The Tax Court reversed the Commissioner, 4 finding specifically
that the taxpayer's home office was his principal place of business. 5
The Tax Court abandoned the "focal point" test, which identified
the principal place of business as that "where services are performed
and income is generated," citing criticism of the test by two courts
of appeals.' 6 The Tax Court formulated a new "facts and circumstances" test, which provided "that where management or administrative activities are essential to the taxpayer's trade or business
and the only available office space is in the taxpayer's home, the
'home office' can be his 'principal place of business.' "'v
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

935 F.2d at 53.
113 S. Ct. at 704.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

14. 94 T.C. at 29. This was an eleven to six decision. Id.at 31-34, 41.
15. Id. at 29.

16. Id. at 24-25. Criticism of the focal point test is found specifically in Meiers
v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986), Weissman v. Commissioner, 751

F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1984), and Drucker v. Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2nd Cir.
1983). These courts generally advocated a "comparative analysis of the functions
performed at each location." 113 S. Ct. at 705.
17. 935 F.2d at 54. The tax court listed three factors that weighed heavily in
finding that the taxpayer's home office was his principal place of business: "[The]
home office is essential to [the taxpayer's] business, he spends substantial time
there, and there is no other location available to perform the office functions of
the business." 94 T.C. at 29.
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The Commissioner appealed to the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals. 8 The court of appeals affirmed the Tax Court's decision
and approved the new facts and circumstances test. 9 The court
supported its' decision by citing a proposed Treasury regulation
allowing salespersons who spend "a substantial amount of time on
paperwork at home" to deduct expenses for home offices.20 Although
the court acknowledged that the proposed regulation was not binding,
it declared that the regulation reflected a policy of permitting home
office deductions for taxpayers who legitimately maintain home offices, even if a majority of the taxpayer's time is not spent in the
2
office. '

The Supreme Court granted certiorari 22 to resolve the conflict
of the various tests advocated by the different circuits in determining
23
the principal place of business with the presence of a home office.
The Supreme Court reversed the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
and reinstated the focal point test with a few modifications, declaring
that the hospital was the taxpayer's principal place of business,
thereby disallowing any deductions for a home office.2 4
III.

A.

HISTORICAL

DEVELOPMENT

The "Appropriate and Helpful" Test

Section 162(a) of the Internal Revenue Code 25 allows "as a
deduction all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred
18. Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1991).
19. Id. at 53, 55. This was a two to one decision. Id.
20. Id. at 54 (citing Prop. Income Tax Reg. § 1.280A-2(b)(3), 45 Fed. Reg.
52,399 (1980) (proposed Aug. 7, 1980), as amended, 48 Fed. Reg. 33,320 (1983)
(proposed July 21, 1983)). This regulation was proposed in 1980 but has not yet
been approved by the Commissioner. Id. at 54 n.3. "Under the Commissioner's
regulation promulgation procedures, a proposed regulation can lay dormant indefinitely until the Commissioner either withdraws the proposal or adopts a final
draft of a proposal as a regulation." Id.
21. Id. at 54-55.
22. Commissioner v. Soliman, 112 S. Ct. 1472 (1991).
23. 113 S. Ct. at 705-06 (citing Meiers, 782 F.2d at 79; Weissman, 751 F.2d
at 514). The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Meiers held that the principal
place of business was "where work is predominately performed." 782 F.2d at 79.
The court reached this decision by examining the amount of time spent in the
home office along with the importance of the business functions performed there,
the business necessity of having a home office and the expenses required to establish
the home office. Id.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Weissman found that the taxpayer's
principal place of business was "where the dominant portion of his work is
accomplished." 751 F.2d at 514. This conclusion was reached by comparing the
amount of time spent at each location and the importance of the activities performed
at each location. Id. at 515.
24. 113 S. Ct. at 708.
25. 26 U.S.C. § 162(a) (1988).
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during the taxable year in carrying on any trade or business." 26
Prior to the Tax Reform Act of 1976, there was no statutory provision
to guide courts in determining ordinary and necessary expenses for
a home office, and the case law regarding deductions for an office
in a personal residence was unsettled. 27 Thus, whether the deduction
was granted varied from court to court. 28 Generally, the courts
permitted taxpayers to deduct a pro rata share of proper expenses
allocated to a home office under § 162(a) if the expenses were found
to be "appropriate and helpful" to the taxpayer's business. 29 This
allowed many taxpayers to deduct otherwise nondeductible family
and living expenses as business expenses.3°
To eliminate this "loophole," Congress passed § 280A as part
of the Tax Reform Act of 1976. 3 1 Section 280A provides that "no
deduction otherwise allowable under this chapter shall be allowed
with respect to the use of a dwelling unit which is used . . . as a
residence. 32 The restrictions of § 280A serve as an exception to
the deductions allowed by § 162(a).3 a There are three exceptions to
§ 280A, found in § 280A(c), two of which are relevant .here:
Subsection (a) shall not apply to any item to the extent that
such item is allocable to a portion of the dwelling unit which is
exclusively used on a regular basis-(A) the principal place of
business for any trade or business of the taxpayer. (B) [A]s a
place of business which is used by patients, clients, or customers
in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course of

his trade or business

....

34

This statute was Congress' answer to what it saw as a need for
explicit rules establishing the proper standard for determining the
26. Id.
27. Fellows, supra note 3, at 332.
28. Fellows, supra note 3, at 332.
29. 113 S. Ct. at 705. See Newi v. Commissioner, 432 F.2d 998 (2nd Cir. 1970)
(allowing deduction for a television executive who watched television advertisements
of competitors in "home office").
30. 113 S.Ct. at 705. See also H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 160,
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3050, 3053-54.
31. 935 F.2d at 54 (referring to The Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codified in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.)).
32. 26 U.S.C. § 280A(a) (1988).
33. 113 S. Ct. at 705.
34. 26 U.S.C. § 280A(c)(l)(A) and (B) (1988). There is a third exception in §
280A(c)(1)(C) which allows for a deduction "in the case of a separate structure
which is not attached to the dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer's trade
or business." For a short discussion of the deduction allowed under this particular
section, see Henri C. Pusker, Home Office Deductions: Some Good News, 18 J.
REAL EsT. TAX'N 24, 31 (1990).
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deductibility of expenses of a home office. 3 Congress was concerned
that expenses, which were otherwise considered nondeductible because
they were personal, living, and family expenses, might become
deductible business expenses because the expenses were "appropriate
and helpful" in performing a portion of the taxpayer's business in
his home. 3 6 Congress hoped to eliminate the "subjective
determination" inherent in the "appropriate and helpful" standard
37
by providing "definitive rules" in § 280A.
B.

The "Focal Point" Test

Congress never defined "principal place of business" in § 280A,
38
and the tax courts responded by developing the "focal point" test.
In the case of a self-employed taxpayer, the focal point was that
place where goods or services generated by the taxpayer were provided
to customers. 39 One of the leading cases in developing the focal
point test was Baie v. Commissioner ° In Baie, the taxpayer owned
a hot dog stand and sold food to the public. 4' Because of the
cramped quarters of the stand, she prepared the food to be sold
in her kitchen and used a -spare bedroom to keep records of the
business. 42 Prior to the passage of § 280A, the Tax Court no doubt
would have allowed deductions for use of the rooms in her home
because such usage was "appropriate and helpful" for her sales
from the hot dog stand. 43 However, the Tax Court held that the
principal place of business, the focal point for a sole proprietor,
was where the sales were actually made to the consuming public,
44
not where any preparation or essential record-keeping took place.
Thus, the taxpayer was denied any deductions for the use of her
home.

C.

45

Criticism of the Focal Point Test

It was not long before criticism of the focal point test emerged
in several of the circuit courts of appeals. In Drucker v.
35. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 160, reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3050, 3053.
36. Id. at 3053-54.
37. Id. at 3054.
38. 935 F.2d at 54.
39. Id. In the case of an employee, the focal point was where the taxpayer's
income was generated, i.e., his employer's place of business. Fellows, supra note
3, at 332.
40. 74 T.C. 105 (1980).
41. Id.at 106.
42. Id. at 106-07.
43. Id.at 108.
44. Id.at 109.
45. Id.
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Commissioner,46 the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
Tax Court's decision that deductions for expenses incurred in a
"home office" were disallowed . 7 The taxpayers were employed as

concert musicians by the Metropolitan Opera.4 The taxpayers had
practice rooms set up in their homes where they spent thirty to
thirty-two hours per week studying or practicing, many more hours
than were spent in actual rehearsal or performance. 49 The Tax Court
applied the focal point test and held that the taxpayers, as employees,
had the same principal place of business as their employer, Lincoln
Center.50 The court of appeals rejected this and declared that the
home practice studios of the musicians were their principal places
of business.-' Although the court acknowledged that the taxpayers
were employees, the court held that this was a "rare situation in
which an employee's principal place of business is not that of his
employer." 2 The court further stated that this finding was in harmony
with the legislative history of § 280A. 51 The failure of their employer
to provide practice facilities to the musicians and the requirement
of private practice for their profession were considered to be overriding
54
factors.

The following year the Second Circuit Court of Appeals followed
its decision in Drucker, again reversing the Tax Court, in Weissman
5 The taxpayer, a college professor,
v. Commissioner."
spent
approximately twenty percent of his working time on the college
campus and eighty percent in his home office. 6 Although the school
did provide office space on the campus, it had to be shared with
other professors, and even the Tax Court found that it was not
safe for the taxpayer to leave his teaching, research, or writing notes
and equipment in that office.5 7 Nevertheless, the Tax Court sought
to determine the focal point of the taxpayer's business activities and
f lnd* -,*that, for
ths oo who
,*.
,n.
UIh. teach,
o.
is tLiIe .ucational insstitu- n .IL IS
The court of appeals declared that the Tax Court had "focused too
much on Professor Weissman's title and too little on his activities,"
"

;U

46. 715
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. 751
56. Id.
17. Id.
58. Id.

F.2d 67 (2nd Cir. 1983).
at 68.
at 68-69.
at 69.

at 70.
F.2d 512 (2nd Cir. 1984).
at 513.
at 514.

t,,JI

U

,L

n

l

i1,,-.
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and that as a matter of law it erred by failing to contemplate all
aspects of the taxpayer's activities.5 9 The court specifically criticized
the use of the focal point test because it is centered on the place
where the work of the taxpayer is more visible, instead of where
the primary portion of the work is performed.6° The court saw; a
similarity between the practice room required for a musician in
Drucker and a suitable office for a college professor. 6' Both were
viewed as a "practical necessity" that justified the deductions. 62
The focal point test was criticized once more, this time by the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in Meiers v. Commissioner.6 This
case represents the first challenge to the focal point test involving
self-employed taxpayers. The taxpayers owned a self-service
laundromat. One of the taxpayers, functioning as manager, spent
twice as much time with record-keeping activities in the taxpayers'
home office as in the laundromat itself. 4 It was undisputed that
these taxpayers had made a logical business decision to locate their
office in their home instead of the laundromat. 65 Applying the focal
point test, the Tax Court disallowed any deductions for the home
office, concluding that the laundromat itself was the focal point of
the taxpayers' laundry business." Citing Drucker and Weissman, the
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals questioned the practicality of the
focal point test 67 and agreed with the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
that the focus was mistakenly placed on more visible business
activities." The court conceded that the focal point test was an
easier standard to implement, but it did not believe that the test
was fair to taxpayers or appropriately carried out the intent of
Congress. 69 The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals declared that the
59. Id.
60. Id.

61. Id. at 514-15.
62. Id. The court stated "in each case the determination of a taxpayer's principal
place of business depends on the nature of his business activities, the attributes
of the space in which such activities can be conducted, and the practical necessity
of using a home office to carry out such activities." Id. The court noted that not
only did the taxpayer spend the majority of his time in the home office, but the
home office was required because of the lack of suitable office space on the campus.
Id. at 515. In addition, because the taxpayer was an employee of the college, he
had to satisfy the convenience-of-the-employer test, which the court found was
met. Id. at 516-17.
63. 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir. 1986).
64. Id. at 76.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 78-79.

68. Id. at 79.
69. Id.
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taxpayers' principal place of business was their home office and
suggested several factors to be considered in such a determination,
including the relative amount of time spent in the home office, the
importance of the tasks performed in the home office, the business
necessity of a home office, and the expense in establishing and
maintaining the office in the taxpayer's home. 70 After applying these
factors, and in light of the Commissioner's concession that there
was no attempt by the taxpayers to "convert non-deductible personal
living expenses into deductible business expenses," the Seventh Circuit
7
allowed the home office deduction. '
In 1988, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a case
which presented a fact situation very similar to Soliman. In Pomarantz
v. Commissioner,72 the taxpayer was an emergency room physician
7
who worked as an independent contractor at a local hospital. 1
Although he was not provided with private office space at the
hospital, he did have access to a work area in the hospital that was
furnished with a desk, chair, telephone, and medical texts. 74 The
taxpayer maintained an office in his home, where he kept patient
records, business records, and his medical library. 75 During the tax
years in question, the taxpayer spent thirty-three to thirty-six hours
per week at the hospital and usually even fewer hours per week
working in his home office.7 6 The Ninth Circuit declared that a
taxpayer can only have one principal place of business for each
trade or business. 77 The court of appeals upheld the Tax Court's
use of the focal point test in finding that the taxpayer's principal
place of business was the hospital where he performed his professional
services. 78 Although the court of appeals did not endorse any standard
to determine whether home office deductions should be allowed, the
court did declare that, under any of the tests used by the Tax Court,
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, or the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals, the hospital was the taxpayer's principal place of
79
business .
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Id.
Id.
867 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1988).
Id. at 495.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 495-96.

77. Id. at 496 (citing Curphey v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 766, 776 (1980)).
78. Id. at 497.

79. Id. The Tax Court advocated the "focal point" test (Bae v. Commissioner,
74 T.C. 105, 109 (1980)), the Second Circuit Court of Appeals urged a comparison
of time spent and importance of the activities between the various locations (Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512, 514 (2nd Cir. 1984)), and the Seventh Circuit
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The "Facts and Circumstances" Test

In 1990, the Tax Court in Soliman v. Commissioner o
acknowledged criticism of the focal point test by the Second and
Seventh Circuit Courts of Appeals and declared that "[iln light of
this response, we believe we need to revisit the 'focal point' test
and our interpretation of § 280A ... ."8 The Tax Court admitted
that application of the focal point test in the taxpayer's situation
would have resulted in a conclusion that the home office was not
the principal place of business. 82 The court then criticized the test
as practically eliminating "the principal place of business exception"
provided to taxpayers in § 280A.13 Subsection (A) permits deductions
for home offices if it is the taxpayer's principal place of business;
subsection (B) allows a deduction if the home office is used for
meeting clients or customers.8 The Tax Court reasoned that by
treating the principal place of business as the place where the taxpayer
meets clients or customers, the focal point test effectively eliminates
the principal place of business exception."5 The court then declared
that determining the "principal place of business" requires a review
of the "facts and circumstances" of each case and concluded that
the principal place of business may be the administrative headquarters
of the business, even though the taxpayer meets customers and clients
86
elsewhere.
Court of Appeals examined the relative amount of time spent in the home office,
considered with the importance of the functions performed in the home office, the
business necessity of the office, and the expenses required to establish the home
office (Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75, 79 (7th Cir. 1986)).
80. 94 T.C. 20 (1990). This Tax Court decision was appealed to the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals and then to the United States Supreme Court. It is the
Supreme Court decision that is the subject of this casenote.
81. Id. at 25.
82. Id.
83. Id.

84. 26 U.S.C. § 280A(c)(1)(A) and (B) (1988).
85. 94 T.C. at 25. See Drucker v. Commissioner, 79 T.C. at 623 (Wilbur, J.,
dissenting).
Congress provided exceptions to the restrictions of section 280A by
allowing deductions for a home office if either the home office is the
taxpayer's principal place of business, section 280A(c)(1)(A), or it is used
for meeting with the taxpayer's patients, clients, or customers in the
taxpayer's business, section 280A(c)(1)(B). Goods and services could be
transferred to customers and clients in the taxpayer's home, the "focal
point," only if the taxpayer meets clients or customers in his home. The
"focal point" test, therefore, merges the "principal place of business"
exception with the "meeting clients" exception and practically eliminates
the principal place of business exception from section 280A.
94 T.C. at 25.
86. 94 T.C. at 25-26. Optimism that the focal point test had been abandoned
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The Tax Court acknowledged that the circuit courts' criticisms
of the focal point test had suggested a comparison of the amount
of time spent at various locations to determine the principal place
of business.8 7 The Tax Court rejected such a comparison in Soliman
as misleading, because the diversity of the activities performed at
each location would not lend itself to proper comparison.8 8 The
court declared that a taxpayer could qualify for deduction for a
home office if the amount of time spent in the home office was
"substantial. 89 The Tax Court further justified its decision by citing
a proposed regulation directed at home office use by salespeople,
where the standard of allowing a deduction was a "substantial
amount of time." 9 The court reasoned that the proposed regulation
recognized that taxpayers like Soliman may qualify for legitimate
deductions for an office in the residence if there is no other space
available and the taxpayer spends a substantial amount of time in
the office. 9 1 Pomarantz92 was distinguished as a case in which "the
taxpayer ... spent an insubstantial amount of time in his home
office." 93 In addition to the amount of time spent in the home
office, the court listed other considerations. These included whether
was reflected in articles that appeared shortly after the Tax Court decision was
announed. See, e.g., Wisdom of Soliman Opens Door to Home Office Deductions,
68 TAXES 403 (1990) (reprintedfrom CCH STANDARD FEDERAL TAX REPORTS No.
7, (Tax Focus), February 21, 1990); John C. Zimmerman, Abandonment of the
Focal Point Test for Office-in-Home Deductions, 68 TAXEs 434 (1990); Mark Levine,
Note, Home Office Deductions: Deserving Taxpayers Finally Get a Break, 45 TAX
LAWYER 247 (1991).
87. 94 T.C. at 24-25 (citing Meiers v. Commissioner, 782 F.2d 75 (7th Cir.
1986); Weissman v. Commissioner, 751 F.2d 512 (2d Cir. 1984); and Drucker v.
Commissioner, 715 F.2d 67 (2d Cir. 1983)).
88. Id.at 26.
89. Id. at 27.
90. Prop. Income Tax Reg., 45 Fed. Reg. 52,399 (Aug. 7, 1980), as amended
48 Fed. Reg. 33,320 (July 21, 1983). This regulation proposed that if an outside
salesperson had no other office available except his home office and he spent a
"substantial amount of time" in this office, the home office could qualify as the
principal place of business for the salesperson. The court pointed out that the
regulation did not require the salesperson to spend more time in his office than
on the road to qualify for the deductions, thus eliminating any comparison test.
94 T.C. at 27. However, this regulation has never been enacted by the Commissioner.
See supra note 21.
91. 94 T.C. at 27. One of the criticisms by Justice Ruwe in his dissent in
Soliman was the weight placed on a proposed regulation because "[piroposed
regulations are not entitled to judicial deference." Id. at 37 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
92. Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1988).
93. 94 T.C. at 27. Another criticism Justice Ruwe expressed in his dissent of
the Soliman decision was that no such finding was made by the court in Pomarantz.
The Ninth Circuit simply found that Dr. Pomarantz "spent more time on duty at
the hospital rather than at home." Id. at 39 (Ruwe, J., dissenting) (quoting
Pomarantz v. Commissioner, 867 F.2d at 497) (emphasis added).
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the home office was necessary, whether the activities of the home
office were essential to the business, whether the home office was
suitable for the business activities, and whether the furnishings of
the home office were appropriate for an office. 94 The court declared
that § 280A was not intended to force a taxpayer to rent commercial
office space instead of working out of a home office and that Dr.
Soliman's deductions were the type that Congress intended to allow. 95
The Tax Court concluded that the taxpayer's home office was his
principal place of business and listed three factors that, if present,
would give other taxpayers the same favorable holding: 1) the office
is essential to the taxpayer's business; 2) a substantial amount of
time is spent in the office; and 3) no other office is available to
the taxpayer. 96
The dissenting opinion by Judge Nims advocated continued
use of the focal point test, modified somewhat to allow taxpayers
the desired deductions if they spend the majority of their time in
the home office. 97 This would maintain the test already established
by the courts and also take into consideration unusual situations
like musicians and college professors, who spend more time at
home than anywhere else. 98 Justice Ruwe, in his dissent,
acknowledged that the focal point test in some situations may
unduly emphasize the location where the activities of the taxpayer
are more visible. 99 However, he declared that deductions are a
"legislative grace" and should be construed strictly.10' He ultimately
urged adoption of the standard of "where the dominant portion
'10
of the taxpayer's work is accomplished." '
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the Tax Court's
decision and endorsed the new facts and circumstances test.' 0 2 After
reviewing the history of the home office deductions, the court of
appeals cited the proposed regulation regarding deductions for
94. Id. at 28.
95. Id. at 29.
96. Id. at 28.

97. Id. at 32 (Nims, J., dissenting).
98. Id. Both Judge Nims and Judge Ruwe, in each respective dissent, felt that
the new "facts and circumstances" test was a return to the old "appropriate and
helpful" test, a test used by the courts prior to the passage of section 280A and
resulting in abuses by taxpayers. Id. at 33 (Nims, J., dissenting) and 39 (Ruwe,
J., dissenting). It was these very abuses that Congress was targeting when it passed
§ 280A. H.R. REP. No. 658, 94th Cong., 2nd Sess. 160, reprinted in 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3050 at 3053-3054.
99. 94 T.C. at 34 (Ruwe, J., dissenting).
100. Id.at 40.
101/ Id. at 41.
102. Soliman v. Commissioner, 935 F.2d 52, 55 (4th Cir. 1991).
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home offices of outside salespersons as a reflection of the same
policy embodied in the new facts and circumstances test. 10 3 The
court held that the regulation "evince[d] a policy to allow 'home
office' deductions for taxpayers who maintain 'legitimate' home
offices, even if the taxpayer does not spend a majority of his time
in the office."'°4
Judge Phillips dissented, 05 agreeing with the dissent in the
Tax Court opinion. He urged a continuation of the focal point
test with some modifications. 10 6 Judge Phillips believed that the
deduction should be granted for a home office only if the taxpayer
spent the majority of his time in the office or if the most important
10 7
work of the business was conducted in this office.
IV.

REASONING OF THE SUPREME COURT

The Supreme Court rejected the new facts and circumstances
test and reinstated, for the most part, the focal point test. 108 Writing
for the majority, Justice Kennedy declared that when interpreting
the meaning of the words of the statute, the Court looks to the
" 'ordinary, everyday senses' of the words."' 1 9 The dictionary
definition of "principal" is "most important, consequential, or
influential." 110 To determine the principal place of business, that
location which is the "most important, consequential, or influential," courts must compare all the places where business is
conducted."'
The majority criticized the new test advocated by the Tax
Court and upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals as a
return to the old "appropriate and helpful" test that Congress
sought to eliminate with the passage of § 280A."12 By allowing
103. Id. at 54.
104. ia.

at 55.

105. Id. at 55 (Phillips, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 56.
107. Id. Judge Phillips further stated that a fair application of § 280A compelled
a comparison of the various business locations to determine which was the principal
place of business. Id.
108. 113 S. Ct. at 707. The Court stated, "In determining the proper test for
deciding whether a home office is the principal place of business, we cannot develop
an objective formula that yields a clear answer in every case." Id. at 706. But
the Court later concluded that "the point where services are rendered or goods
delivered is a principal consideration in most cases." Id. at 707. This is the essence
of the "focal point" test.
109. Id. at 705-06 (quoting Malat v. Riddell, 383 U.S. 569, 571 (1966) (per
curiam) (quoting Crane v. Commissioner, 331 U.S. 1, 6 (1947))).
110. Id. at 706 (quoting WEBSTER's THRD NEw INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1802
(1971)).
111. Id.

112. Id.
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deductions that are "essential" to a taxpayer's business, the test
failed to discern "whether the home office is more significant in
the taxpayer's business than every other place of business."" 3 Since
§ 280A permits deductions only for the principal place of business,
the majority stated there must be a determination of what is the
4
most important place of business."
Acknowledging that a hard and fast rule would be impossible,
the majority listed two primary considerations that should be used
to determine if a home office is the principal place of business:
"[T]he relative importance of the activities performed at each
business location and the time spent at each place."" ' 5 To ascertain
the level of importance at the various business locations, the trier
of fact must first develop an "objective description of the business
in question.""16 With this "objective description" in hand, the
judge can classify the activities at each location in light of the
unique characteristics of a particular business or trade."17 The
majority acknowledged the usefulness of the focal point test and
concluded that "the point where goods and services are delivered
must be given great weight in determining the place where the
most important functions are performed.""' 8 The Court strengthened the focal point inquiry by declaring that "the point where
services are rendered or goods delivered is a principal consideration
in most cases."" 9 A "further and weighty consideration" is whether
the goods or services are delivered at a facility that has unusual
20
or special features, such as a hospital.'
Believing that all parts of a business are integrated and essential, the Court refused to give much weight to the "essential"
nature of the business conducted in the taxpayer's home office as
the court of appeals had.' 2 ' The Court was equally unswayed by
the absence of alternative office space for the taxpayer, a factor
that the court of appeals found important. 122 The Court saw this
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.The Court went on to point out that as long as a taxpayer meets with
clients or patients in his home office or delivers goods or services in his home
office, he will be allowed the deduction, even though it is not determined to be
the principal place of business. The reasoning for this allowance is because Congress
has granted this deduction for such visits or deliveries when conducted in the
normal course of business. Id.at 706-07.
119. Id.at 707.
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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as a significant factor in the case of an employee using a home
office for the convenience of the employer, but saw no relevance
in terms of a self-employed taxpayer.'2 3
The majority further stated that if an evaluation of the importance of the different locations of the business did not yield
a clear answer as to the principal place of business, the trier of
fact should then examine the amount of time spent at each location. 124 Concluding that, in the medical profession, the treatment
given to patients was the most important event, that the delivery
of such treatment was in a facility with special characteristics and
that more time was spent in the special facility than in the home
office, the majority held that the home office deductions sought
125
by the taxpayer were not allowed.
Justice Blackmun, in his concurring opinion, declared that,
in addition to the arguments espoused by the majority, deductions
from gross income are a matter of congressional grace, not a
matter of right. 26 He viewed the starting point as a presumption
against deductibility to which is applied any precise exceptions
127
explicitly supplied by the Tax Code.
In a concurring opinion joined by Justice Scalia, Justice Thomas
advocated an unqualified return to the focal point test. 2 Justice
Thomas argued that the test espoused by the majority would require
the factfinder to engage in full evidentiary hearings to determine
the principal place of business. 129 Additionally, he contended that
the majority provided no guidance as to how the "two-factor
inquiry" should work. 30 He reasoned that where the income is
generated, that place where the goods or services are delivered to
the client or customer, determines the principal place of business.'
Justice Thomas strongly believed that the Court erred by not
123. Id.
124. Id. The Court indicated that there may be cases where a principal place
of business may not be found. In such cases, the home office expenses are not
deductible simply by default, but are deductible only because they satisfy the
requirements of the statute. Id. at 707-08.
125. Id. at 708. The Court reiterated its point that whether or not the functions
performed in the home office were essential to the delivery of services to the
patients in the hospital was not controlling. Id.
126. Id. at 708 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (citing Commissioner v. Sullivan, 356
U.S. 27, 28 (1958) and Commissioner v. Tellier, 383 U.S. 687, 693 (1966)).
127. Id.
128. Id. at 709 (Thomas, J., concurring).
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id. Justice Thomas further interpreted the focal point test to include a
"totality of the circumstances" approach in cases where there were multiple points
of sale. Id.
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adopting the focal point test outright and, by not so doing, failed
not only to clarify a question of law, but made the question more
32

obscure.
The sole dissenter in Soliman was Justice Stevens. Justice
Stevens argued that denying the taxpayer deductions for his home
office "deviates from Congress' purpose in enacting [§ 280A], and
unfairly denies an intended benefit to the growing number of selfemployed taxpayers who manage their businesses from a home
office."1 33 Justice Stevens pointed out that the expenses in Soliman
fell within the general rule of deductibility. 3 4 The expenses were
questioned, however, because the taxpayer's residence was the site
of the office. 35 If the office had been located in someone else's
house or in a separate structure located on the same property as
36
the taxpayer's home, these deductions would have been allowed.
While acknowledging that deductions are a matter of congressional grace, Justice Stevens felt that the majority's reading
of the statute was too restrictive and resulted in "unequal treatment
of similarly situated taxpayers.' 3 7 Justice Stevens observed that
the major abuse which Congress sought to eliminate was the
deduction of a home office by employees who were working at
home on evenings and weekends and using the home as a "second
office" for their own convenience and not for the convenience of
the employer.' 38 Section 280A requires a self-employed taxpayer
to satisfy three conditions in order to qualify for a home office
deduction. These three conditions, observed Justice Stevens, are
more stringent than the "appropriate and helpful" standard that
Congress was trying to eliminate. 39 First, the taxpayer must set
aside a room or a portion of his residence for exclusive use in
the business. 4 Justice Stevens stated that this requirement alone
eliminates many of the employee abuses associated with home
132. Id. at 710-11.
133. Id. at 711 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 712. Justice Stevens further argues that such unfair treatment could
have been required by the statute itself if such result was intended by Congress,
but there was no reason to believe that this was Congress' intent. Id. Justice
Stevens agreed with the Tax Court's statement that "Section 280A was not enacted
to compel a taxpayer to rent office space rather than work out of his own home."
Id. at 712 n.3 (citing Soliman v. Commissioner, 94 T.C. 20, 29 (1990)).
138. Id. at 713 and n.8. Justice Stevens opines that "Congress may have been
particularly offended by the home office deductions claimed by employees of the
Internal Revenue Service." Id. at 712 n.6.
139. Id.at 713.
140. Id.
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office deductions.' 4 ' Second, the taxpayer must use this designated
space "on a regular basis.''1 42 Although there is no definition of
what constitutes a regular basis,' 43 it appeared clear to Justice
Stevens that § 280A requires the use of the space to be substantial.
Third, the taxpayer must meet one of the exceptions listed in
§ 280A(c)(1).'4
Justice Stevens acknowledged that the taxpayer did not meet
the conditions of § 280A(c)(1)(B), that the home office be used
to meet clients or customers, or of § 280A(c)(l)(C), that the home
office be contained in a separate structure. 145 It seemed clear to
Justice Stevens that § 280A(c)(1)(A) was designed to cover those
"places where the taxpayer does not normally meet with patients,
clients, or customers.' ' 46 Justice Stevens criticized the majority for
its focus on the word "principal" and its neglect of the phrase
"place of business.' 47 He pointed out that in issues of jurisdiction
and venue, "place of business" for a corporate defendant often
is the administrative headquarters of a company. 148 He reiterated
this point by stating, "The only place where a business is managed
49
is fairly described as its 'principal' place of business."'1
The majority insisted that Congress could have used the words
"principal office" in § 280A to cover situations like that of the
taxpayer but chose not to do so. 50 Justice Stevens responded by
arguing that, in choosing those words, Congress would have further
narrowed the deduction and would have excluded business uses,
such as storage, that would qualify under the present statute. 15 '
Justice Stevens reasoned that the test advocated by the Tax Court
141. Id. There was no assertion by the Commissioner that this condition was
not met by Dr. Soliman.
142. Id.
143. Id. This condition was never in contention by the Commissioner.
144. Id. To qualify, the space must be used as
(A) the principal place of business for any trade or business of the
taxpayer[;] (B) as a place of business which is used by patients, clients,
or customers in meeting or dealing with the taxpayer in the normal course
of his trade or business, or (C) in the case of a separate structure which
is not attached to the dwelling unit, in connection with the taxpayer's
trade or business.
Id. (quoting 26 U.S.C. 280A(c)(1) (1988)).
145. Id.
146. Id. at 714. Justice Stevens, like the Tax Court, argues that by requiring
the principal place of business to be the location where the taxpayer meets with
clients and customers, the Court merges Sections (A) and (B) and renders Subsection
(A) meaningless. Id. See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
147. 113 S. Ct. at 714.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 714-15.
150. Id. at 706.
151. Id. at 715. Justice Stevens gives examples of an artist's studio or a cabinet-
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and upheld by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals was "both
true to the statute and practically incapable of abuse."'1 5 2 Justice

Stevens concluded:
A self-employed person's efficient use of his or her resources
should be encouraged by sound tax policy. When it is clear
that no risk of the kind of abuse that led to the enactment of
§ 280A is present, and when the taxpayer has satisfied a reasonable, even a strict, construction of each of the conditions
set forth in § 280A, a deduction should be allowed for the
ordinary cost of maintaining his home office.'
V.

IMPLICATIONS OF THE SOLIMAN DECISION

The significance of the Soliman decision is two-fold. First,
the return to the focal point test, even with its modifications,
denies the Tax Court the opportunity to fashion a liberal test that
would allow certain taxpayers to receive the deductions of a home
office, even when there is clearly no taxpayer abuse. Unless a
taxpayer can meet the narrow definitions of § 280A, no deductions
will be allowed for a home office, no matter how essential or
important its existence is to the self-employed taxpayer.
Second, rather than clarify the law as the Court hoped to do,
the Soliman decision seems to have muddied the waters more than
before. The majority returned to the focal point test to define the
"principal place of business," but injected "two primary considerations" to further assist in that determination: a comparison of
the fuctions performed at each location and, if that does not
produce a clear answer, a comparison of the amount of time spent
at each location. But how does a factfinder weigh two completely
different functions conducted at two different locations? Is the
court not forced to interject its own value system upon various
activities performed by a taxpayer to determine which is the most
important?
Other issues were left unanswered by the opinion. What if
the taxpayer had spent equal time between the hospitals and his
home office? It would seem that the majority in Soliman would
still deny the deductions, since the taxpayer would be performing
services in a specialized facility and would be unable to meet
patients in his home office. What if the taxpayer had spent more
time in his home office than he did in the hospitals?' 5 4 Because
maker's workshop that might be excluded from allowable home-use deductions if
Congress had chosen the words "principal office." Id.
152. Id.

153. Id.
154. Justice Thomas asks this question in his concurrence. Id. at 711.
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of the professional need to use a facility with unique and special
characteristics, it appears that, even in the face of spending less
time in the hospital than in the home office, the majority would
still hold that the hospital would be the taxpayer's principal place
of business. What if the taxpayer hired employees to administer
most of the anesthesia, supervised them from his home office,
but still made daily trips to the hospital to check on patients,
while occasionally administering anesthesia himself? Because the
taxpayer's income would be derived from services performed at
the hospital, it would still be within the reasoning of the Soliman
decision to deny the taxpayer the deductions for the home office.
Assume that a taxpayer is in commercial construction and
maintains a home office. Is the principal place of business for
such a taxpayer the construction site? It is doubtful that Congress
envisioned that such a principal place of business would change
every few months or every year as one job was completed and a
new one begun. However, under Soliman, the Court might find
that a construction site is such a facility, with unique and special
characteristics that mark it as the principal place of business. What
if the construction manager succeeded in having his home office
declared as his principal place of business by the IRS and then
hired a secretary to work in his home office in order to allow
him to spend more time on the construction sites? Does he then
lose any chance of a deduction because he is spending more time
The focal point test, even with
at the site than in his office?'
the Supreme Court's new modifications, seems to hurt taxpayers
who have legitimate home offices and forces these taxpayers to
rent commercial space.
VI.

CONCLUSION

If a taxpayer freelances outside of his home, it will now be
difficult to meet the standards announced in the Soliman decision
for § 280A deductions. The Supreme Court will continue to narrowly construe the language of § 280A to disallow all but the
obviously-permitted deductions. The self-employed taxpayer's only
hope is congressional relief. As Justice Blackmun observed, "Con-

155. See J. Martin Burke and Michael K. Friel, Recent Developments in the
THE REv. OF TAX'N OF INDlvwuAmS 373 (1990).

Income Taxation of Individuals, 14
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gress must change the statute's words if a different result is desired
as a matter of tax policy.156
Jeannie L. Denniston

156. 113 S. Ct. at 709 (Blackmun, J., concurring).

